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Most of the chemical sector firms in Pakistan have foreign ownership or collaboration with foreign 
companies. It may be hypothesized that the leverage behavior of such firms is likely to be in line with 
the results of international studies of leverage generally carried out in developed economies. But there 
are a number of factors which differentiate developed economies from the developing ones. Hence, we 
identify an interesting conjunction for our research to add to the existing body of literature empirical 
evidence as to what determines leverage in chemical sector firms of Pakistan which have generally 
foreign ownership/collaboration. For this purpose we use the data of all listed firms of chemical sector 
of Pakistan for the period 1988 to 2006 (19 years). We use the framework provided by two competing 
theories, trade-off theory (TOT) and pecking order theory (POT), to identify the determinants of capital 
structure in the sector by using panel data models to identify the determinants of leverage and nature 
of their relationship. We find a significant direct relationship between profitability, business risk and 
leverage. This finding is consistent with TOT and negates the findings of some of the earlier studies in 
Pakistani context. Further, we find an inverse relationship between size, growth and leverage which is 
consistent with POT. These findings suggest that most of the chemical sector firms of Pakistan, having 
foreign ownership/collaboration, use a mix of local and international strategies for their leverage 
formation in Pakistan. 
 
Key words: Pecking order theory, trade-off theory, capital structure, chemical sector, foreign ownership, 
Pakistan. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the advent of the modern theory of capital structure 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), we observe numerous 
theoretical and empirical studies that put forward a 
variety of factors as its determinants. Some of them 
pledge to trade-off theory (TOT) and observe that the 
firms pursue an optimal capital structure and their 
decision of such a debt-equity mix is based on risk-return 
trade-off. While others support pecking order theory 
(POT) and find a hierarchy of financing choices based on 
asymmetric information. The two competing theories; see 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007) for a comprehensive review; are 
broad organizing frameworks (Myers, 1984) and 
encompasses different implications for leverage  behavior  
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of the firms (Qureshi, 2009), but it is difficult to 
adequately distinguish between the two (Fama and 
French, 2002). However, this hot debate in corporate 
finance literature provides a number of determinants of 
the strategic decision of firm’s leverage. Nevertheless, 
addressing the spatial dimension of the issue the em-
pirical studies in different settings for example developed 
countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and so-called 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001) find comparable 
and conflicting impact of these determinants on leverage 
in possibly two different contexts due to a variety of 
differentiating macro factors such as GDP growth rate, 
interest rate, inflation rate, regulatory framework and level 
of capital market development. As such we find an 
interesting concurrence for this study. The chemical 
sector firms in Pakistan have either foreign ownership or 
collaboration with foreign companies mostly of developed 
countries.   The   corporate   governance   mechanism  of  
  
 
 
 
these firms is expected to be in line with their counter-
parts operating in developed countries. Moreover, their 
macro business environment in Pakistan is also likely to 
influence their corporate policies. But considering the 
underdevelopment of the capital market in Pakistan it is 
our hypothesis that these firms might follow corporate 
leverage policy of their counterparts operating in 
developed countries. As such the relationship between 
the leverage and its determinants of these firms is likely 
to be in line with the results of studies carried out in 
developed countries. If so these studies may also be of 
relevance to the foreign companies in Pakistan to help 
shape their leverage policy. With this rationale, the 
objective of this study is to identify the variables and the 
nature of their relationship to determine the leverage of 
listed firms in chemical sector of Pakistan.  
Apart from introduction in this section we arrange this 
paper as follows: review of some of the empirical and 
theoretical literature about determinants of leverage; data 
and methodology; results; conclusions and policy 
implications and at the end we provide the references. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
With perfect market assumptions MM in their classic 
paper (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) argued that the firm 
value was independent of its debt equity mix. Soon they 
were refuted but the debate initiated by them resulted into 
a rich array of corporate finance literature. We review 
some of the relevant literature in the following para-
graphs, which provides many explanations of corporate 
financing choices and helps develop the theoretical 
framework for this study. 
 
 
Interest tax shield 
 
Researchers argue that a firm borrows until tax shield 
benefit balances the costs associated with it such as 
bankruptcy suggesting a U-shaped relationship between 
interest tax shield and leverage (Miller, 1977). But em-
pirical studies observed that such a relationship is either 
relatively weak (Booth et al., 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), or positive and significant (Givoly and Hayn 1992; 
Graham, 1996a, 1996b; Wu and Yue, 2009).  
 
 
Non-debt tax shield 
 
The non-debt tax shield, which includes depreciation and 
investment tax credits, may act as a substitute to interest 
tax shield and as such the firms with higher level of non-
debt tax shield may use less debt financing (DeAngelo 
and Masulis, 1980) indicating an inverse relationship 
between non-debt tax shield and leverage of a firm.  
Empirical results are  inconclusive  (Deesomsak  et  al., 
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2004; Delcoure, 2007) and some suggest a direct 
relationship (Wu and Yue, 2009) while others indicate an 
insignificant relationship between non-debt tax shield and 
leverage (Mazur, 2007) which is also observed in 
Pakistan (Sheikh and Wang, 2011).  
 
 
Agency costs 
 
The researchers use notion of agency conflict (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) as probability of non-productive use 
of firm’s resources by managers and/or owners and 
consequent costs to explain leverage behavior of a firm. 
Theorists suggest that increased debt reduces amount of 
free cash available for non-productive uses that may help 
reduce such a counterproductive behavior. The non-
productive use of firm’s resources such as perquisites 
that inflate expenses with expenses/net revenue as its 
proxy, and/or inflated cost of production and sales with 
cost of sales/net revenue as its proxy. As such, a direct 
relationship between debt and agency costs is expected 
(Mazur, 2007). Further, the equity holders having limited 
liability in the firm may invest in high risk projects. 
Success increases their wealth and the debt holders bear 
the consequences of failure. This suggests a direct 
relationship between debt and shareholders-debtholders 
agency conflict, firm’s growth being its proxy.  
Another line of argument is that the growing firms have 
more opportunities to invest in risky projects at the 
expense of creditors so a negative relationship is also 
expected between growth and leverage of firms. Em-
pirical evidences indicate an inverse relationship between 
growth and leverage (Eriotis et al., 2007; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988), while others 
find a positive relationship (Baskin, 1989; Allen, 1993), 
but a study finds this relationship to be insignificant in 
Pakistan (Sheikh and Wang, 2011). 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry, wherein investors and creditors 
have less information as compared to the insiders, may 
be another determinant of firm leverage. Some of the 
researchers observe that the management uses 
profitability to reduce information asymmetry and issues 
new shares only when they perceive that their stock is 
not undervalued. Following this strand of argument, we 
anticipate an inverse relationship between profitability 
and leverage (Myers, 1984). Others however, argue that 
more profitable firms can issue debt at lower interest 
rates as these are perceived less risky by the lenders 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988) and as such they expect a 
direct relationship between profitability and debt of a firm. 
Results obtained from empirical studies explain both 
inverse (Mazur, 2007; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) as well 
as direct (Abor, 2005)  relationships  between  profitability 
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and leverage. Recent studies carried out for the entire 
manufacturing sector of Pakistan suggest an inverse 
relationship and dominance of POT (Qureshi, 2009; 
Sheikh and Wang, 2011). Moreover, the firms also use 
dividends as a signal to the market to reduce asymmetric 
information while issuing equity. Consequently an inverse 
relationship is expected between dividends and leverage 
(John and Williams, 1985). Empirical results suggest an 
inverse relationship (Tong and Green, 2005) while results 
obtained from the developing economies show no 
influence of dividend payments on the leverage (Al-Najjar 
and Taylor, 2008; Mazur, 2007). On the other hand, 
some studies support POT and suggest a direct 
relationship in developed economy (Allen, 1993) as well 
as in Pakistani context (Qureshi, 2009). 
 
 
Business risk 
 
The firms with higher volatility in their earnings are 
considered as highly risky firms and for these firms debt 
will be available at relatively higher interest rates. Further, 
as debt involves a commitment of periodic payments that 
is why firms with high earnings volatility raise lesser debt. 
And as such business risk is likely to have a negative 
relationship with leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Empirical results from developed and developing 
economies show a significant inverse impact of earning 
volatility upon leverage (Booth et al., 2001; Fama and 
French, 2002) but some others find that in developed 
economies volatility do not have any effect on leverage 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
 
Liquidity 
 
The firm’s possession of high level of current assets and 
its ability to generate high cash inflows may help the firm 
to internally finance their investment and operating 
activities and as a result an inverse relationship is 
expected between liquidity and leverage (Myers, 1984). 
Alternatively firms having high liquid assets and high 
cash flow generation may have high debt ratio due to 
their greater ability to meet periodic installments of debt 
financing (Ross, 1977). Following this line of argument a 
direct relationship is also expected between liquidity and 
leverage of a firm. But majority of the studies explain an 
inverse relationship between liquidity and leverage (Al-
Najjar and Taylor, 2008; Eriotis et al., 2007; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Sheikh and Wang, 2011; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). 
 
 
Firm size and tangibility 
 
The theories argue that firms with large amount of fixed 
assets are perceived as less risky by the creditors, 
because  these   firms   have  more  collateralized  assets  
 
 
 
 
which restrict opportunistic behavior. Second, these firms 
can provide collateral to the creditors more easily 
(Jensen, 1976). Moreover, large size firms can borrow 
easily at lower interest rates because their more 
diversified portfolios and lesser chances of bankruptcy 
make them less risky for the creditors (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Thus a direct relationship is expected 
between tangibility of assets and leverage and between 
size and leverage. Results obtained from different studies 
in developed economies confirm a direct relationship 
(Allen, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). However, tangible assets in developing 
countries provide poor collateral values due to under-
developed and inefficient legal and regulatory system as 
well as secondary market that is why an inverse 
relationship is also expected and results obtained from 
different studies confirm it too (Mazur, 2007). For 
Pakistan some studies show that firm size has an inverse 
impact on leverage (Sheikh and Wang, 2011), while 
others show a mix of inverse and direct impact for 
different sectors (Qureshi, 2009). 
 
 
Age 
 
Initially the private firms generally have heavy reliance on 
the personal finances of their owners. As a result of these 
substantial amounts of equity investments by the owners 
they are exposed to the idiosyncratic risk and this risk 
substantially increases the cost of equity. That is why 
over time these firms increase their demand for loan to 
decrease their cost of capital. Empirical results from 
developed economies explain this relationship as well 
(Mueller, 2008). Moreover, according to TOT age of the 
business is an important indicator of corporate credibility 
and older firms may establish good reputation so they 
can borrow easily at lower interest rates. Following this 
direct relationship is expected between age and leverage 
of a firm. Empirical results suggest a direct relationship 
between the age of a business and leverage (Chen and 
Strange, 2005). However, POT predicts an inverse 
relationship between age of a business and the leverage 
as older firms are relatively stable and experienced firms 
and have higher internally generated funds and as such 
require less external financing (Myers, 1984). 
 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION, METHODOLOGY AND MODEL 
SPECIFICATION 
 
For the purpose of this study, we use the data of all 22 firms of 
chemical sector listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) taken from 
the State Bank of Pakistan publications for the period 1988 to 2006 
(SBP, 1988 to 2006) to examine the variations in leverage among 
these firms and as such this study assumes the inherent limitations 
of the dataset. The time and space (firms) dimensions make it a 
panel dataset and as such we consider panel data analysis as an 
appropriate method which is also used in similar studies (Chen, 
2004; Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2010).  
We   use  three  different  proxies  of   leverage:   Model   1   uses  
 Qureshi et al.         981 
 
 
 
Table 1. Variables, their definitions and expected relationship with leverage.  
 
Variable Model name Proxy Expected relationship 
Tax shield TS Tax payments/gross profit +/? 
Non debt tax shield NDTS Total depreciation/total assets - 
Agency cost AC Cost of Sales/net revenue - / + 
Growth GR % change in total assets - / + 
Profitability PR Earnings after tax/sales + 
Dividends DI Dividends/net profit - 
Business risk BR SD (Return on total assets) - / + 
Liquidity LQ Current assets/current liabilities - / + 
Asset structure AS Fixed assets/total assets + 
Business size BZ Ln (total assets) + 
Age of business AG No. of years listed + 
    
Leverage 
L1 LT debt/equity 
  L2 LT debt/(LT debt + equity) 
L3 Total debt/total assets 
 
 
 
long-termdebt/equity (L1), Model 2 uses long-term debt/(long-term 
debt + equity) (L2) and Model 3 uses total debt/total assets (L3). In 
view of the theoretical framework aforementioned, we specify three 
estimators of leverage: Equation 1: pooled ordinary least square 
(OLS) ignoring time and cross section, Equation 2: fixed effects 
(FE) with constant slope  coefficients  but  varying  intercept  across 
 
 
cross section, and Equation 3: random effects (RE). 
 
1 2 1 3 2it it it itY X Xβ β β ε= + + + +L ………………… (1) 
 
1 2 1 3 2it i it it itY X Xβ β β ε= + + + +L ………………… (2) 
 
1 2 1 3 2it i it it it it i itY X X w where wβ β β ε µ= + + + + = +L ………… (3) 
 
where i and t are indices for the firm and time respectively itw  
accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect which is not 
included in the regression model, itµ  represents the remaining 
disturbance term that varies with the individual firms and time.  
We use value of R2 to judge statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients. Moreover, we also use the Akaike Criterion 
(AIC) (Akaike, 1974) as an estimator selection criterion to rank 
competing estimators according to their AIC and select the 
estimator with lowest AIC as a better representation. 
With the help of literature review we identify and present, in Table 
1, the determinants as well as their probable relationships with the 
leverage. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Subsequently, we present and discuss the empirical 
results of each of the three models using three different 
proxies of leverage. 
 
 
Model 1  
 
Table 2 presents pooled OLS, FE and RE results for 
Model 1 which considers long-term debt/equity as a proxy 
of leverage (L1). The results of pooled OLS, which explain 
46.1% of the variations in leverage behavior  of  chemical  
sector of Pakistan, indicate that growth, agency cost and 
business size have significant direct relationship with 
leverage. On the other hand, asset structure, profitability, 
liquidity and age of business have significant negative 
relationship with leverage. The FE on L1 not only better 
explains, 60.3%, the variations in the leverage behavior 
of chemical sector of Pakistan but also identifies dividend 
as additional determinant of leverage. The results 
suggest significant negative relationship of profitability, 
liquidity, dividend and age of business with leverage, and 
a significant positive relationship of business size with 
leverage. Using dummy coefficients we observe that two 
of the firms have debt as their preferred mode of 
financing, on the other hand five firms prefer equity 
(possibly internal). Moreover, the RE on L1 explains 45% 
of the variations in the leverage behavior and implies that 
asset structure, profitability, liquidity, dividend and age of 
business have significant negative relationship, while 
business size and growth have positive relationship with 
leverage.  
The aforementioned results suggest that large firms 
having lesser information asymmetry are likely to have 
better and cheaper access to credit market and hence 
could finance their growth through debt. The results 
suggest that the firms having higher composition of fixed 
assets have higher depreciation (having negative 
coefficient even though  insignificant)  which  provides  an  
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Table 2. Pooled OLS, FE and RE results for L1. 
 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed effects  Random effects 
Coff SE t Coff SE t Coff SE t 
Intercept 0.722 0.069 10.42***  0.700 0.0972 7.201***  0.750 0.083 9.055*** 
AS -0.181 0.041 -4.443***  -0.087 0.0622 -1.401  -0.118 0.052 -2.263** 
BZ 0.021 0.005 3.610***  0.0300 0.0138 2.167**  0.020 0.009 2.157** 
GR 0.0005 0.0002 1.913*  0.0003 0.0002 1.596  0.0004 0.0002 1.827* 
PR -0.018 0.0046 -3.797***  -0.0115 0.0041 -2.796***  -0.012 0.004 -3.052*** 
BR 0.008 0.539 0.0156  -0.689 0.499 -1.381  -0.588 0.493 -1.193 
NDTS -0.068 0.293 0.2329  0.153 0.297 0.5152  0.0494 0.286 0.172 
LQ -0.141 0.011 -12.77***  -0.129 0.0116 -11.08***  -0.129 0.011 -11.47*** 
TS -0.027 0.028 -0.953  -0.0292 0.025 -1.146  -0.031 0.025 -1.244 
AC 0.062 0.037 1.657*  0.051 0.0382 1.335  0.0518 0.0367 1.409 
DI -0.032 0.0201 -1.599  -0.0408 0.0192 -2.124**  -0.038 0.0189 -2.027** 
AG -0.002 0.0007 -3.485***  -0.0045 0.0016 -2.843***  -0.003 0.0011 -2.976*** 
 R2 = 0.48 2 0.461adjR =   R
2 
= 0.644 2 0.603adjR =   R
2 
= 0.47 2 0.45adjR =  
 AIC = −318.046  AIC= −438.65  AIC = −355.43 
 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. 
 
 
 
alternate tax shield source to interest tax shield of debt. 
Moreover, we find support to the internationally 
widespread phenomenon, a negative relationship of 
profitability and liquidity with debt and observe that 
profitable and liquid firms internally finance their needs. 
One interesting finding is that of negative relationship of 
age with leverage, that is, older firms have lesser debt. 
Even though older firms are likely to have lesser 
information asymmetry and better access to the credit 
market but it seems that such firms are either profitable 
and liquid and internally finance themselves or have 
limited investment opportunity set and growth potential 
which may not require them to resort to external finance. 
Observed negative relationship of profitability with 
leverage is consistent with POT as well as the findings of 
some earlier studies in Pakistani context (Qureshi, 2009). 
Generally, we observe that due to foreign ownership 
and/or collaboration the leverage behavior of chemical 
sector firms in Pakistan is in line with leverage behavior 
found in international studies and contradictory to their 
domestic counterparts. Further a direct and significant 
relationship between business risk and leverage, which is 
contradictory to the findings of an earlier study (Sheikh 
and Wang, 2011), suggests that the firms having high 
business risk tend to pass it on to the creditors. The 
socio-economic networks of owners of such firms along 
with poor governance structures of creditors mired by 
political interferences may help provide them easy 
access to credit market resulting into high debt level.  
Considering the superiority of AIC, we observe that FE 
which has the lowest AIC value is an appropriate choice 
to represent firms’ leverage behavior in Pakistan.   
Model  
 
We present in Table 3 the results for Model 2 which uses 
long-term debt/(long-term debt + equity) as proxy for 
leverage to provide some useful insights into the 
determinants of leverage in chemical sector of Pakistan. 
The pooled OLS explains approximately 49.8% of the 
variations in the leverage behavior of chemical sector of 
Pakistan and indicates that profitability, non-debt tax 
shield and age of business have significant inverse 
relationship with leverage, while asset structure, business 
size, growth, and liquidity have significant direct 
relationship with leverage. The FE on L2 explains 
approximately 59.7% of the variations in the leverage 
behavior of chemical sector of Pakistan and suggests 
that asset structure, business size, growth, profitability, 
business risk, liquidity, dividend, age of business are 
significant determinants of leverage, and also suggests 
that profitability, business risk and age of business have 
indirect relationship, while asset structure, business size, 
growth, and liquidity have direct relations with leverage. 
Moreover, the RE on L2 explains 48.9% of the variations 
in the leverage behavior of chemical sector of Pakistan 
and suggests that asset structure, business size, growth, 
profitability, business risk, liquidity, non debt tax shield, 
liquidity and age of business are significant determinants 
of leverage, it also suggests that profitability, business 
risk, non debt tax shield and age of business have 
indirect relationship, while asset structure, business size, 
growth and liquidity have direct relations with leverage. 
Compared to Model 1, Model 2 is a relatively better fit as 
it explains approximately  60%  of  the  variations  in  debt  
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Table 3. Pooled OLS, FE, RE results for L2. 
 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed effects*  Random effects Coff SE t  Coff SE t  Coff SE t 
Intercept -0.108 0.054 -1.99**  -0.136 0.0798 -1.711*  -0.086 0.067 -1.279 
AS 0.402 0.032 12.55***  0.381 0.0511 7.45***  0.393 0.042 9.23*** 
BZ 0.0255 0.005 5.667***  0.037 0.011 3.284***  0.0239 0.0075 3.174*** 
GR 0.0005 0.0002 2.611***  0.0004 0.0002 2.341**  0.0005 0.0002 2.705*** 
PR -0.013 0.0036 -3.518***  -0.010 0.003 -3.055***  -0.011 0.0033 -3.254*** 
BR -0.683 0.424 -1.611  -0.953 0.409 -2.33**  -0.885 0.40 -2.181** 
NDTS -0.745 0.230 -3.23***  -0.230 0.244 -0.944  -0.411 0.235 -1.748* 
LQ 0.018 0.008 2.12**  0.018 0.0095 1.910*  0.0200 0.0093 2.154** 
TS 0.0016 0.0222 0.075  0.0014 0.021 0.0694  -0.0002 0.0207 -0.0073 
AC -0.016 0.029 -0.541  0.0024 0.0313 0.0770  -0.0059 0.0302 -0.196 
DI -0.009 0.015 -0.611  -0.019 0.015 -1.26  -0.016 0.0155 -1.044 
AG -0.002 0.0006 -4.038***  -0.0051 0.001 -3.838***  -0.0033 0.0009 -3.452*** 
 R2 = 0.516 2 0.498adjR =   R
2 
= 0.638 2 0.597adjR =   R
2 
= 0.507 2 0.489adjR =  
 AIC = −512.65  AIC= −561.09  AIC = −505.95 
 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. *dummies are excluded by software due to existence of multicolinearity problem. 
 
 
 
ratio of chemical sector of Pakistan.  
The inverse relationship of size and leverage is 
consistent with POT. However, inverse relationship 
between growth and leverage supports TOT. This leads 
to two observations: first, as the firms’ size increases, 
their supply and reliance on internal sources increases; 
and second, these firms may have limited growth 
opportunities for which they have sufficient internal 
sources and may not require debt. Supplementing this 
with the finding of Model 1, we observe that generally the 
firms in chemical sector of Pakistan do not finance their 
growth through debt, but the firms having high business 
risk tend to pass it on to the creditors.  
With lowest value AIC, we consider FE a better 
representation of corporate leverage behavior in Pakistan 
for L2. 
 
 
Model 3  
 
We use total debt/total assets (L3) as a proxy of leverage 
for Model 3 and present the results in Table 4. The 
pooled OLS model explains 18.9% variations in the 
leverage behavior of chemical sector of Pakistan. The 
results depict that profitability and business risk have 
significant direct relationship with leverage. The FE 
explains 16.9% variations and suggests that profitability 
and business risk are significant factors and have direct 
relationship with leverage. Similarly, RE explains 19.2% 
variations and suggests that profitability and business risk 
have significant and direct relationship with leverage of 
chemical sector of Pakistan. This finding suggests that 
internal cash generation helps reduce firms’ debt 
dependence which is consistent with POT and  is  also  in  
conformity of some of the earlier international studies 
(Eriotis et al., 2007; Mazur, 2007) as well as studies in 
Pakistani context (Qureshi, 2009; Sheikh and Wang, 
2011). Moreover, direct relationship of the business risk 
with leverage suggests that the firms try to pass on their 
risk to the creditors, which is in contradiction to an earlier 
study in Pakistani context (Sheikh and Wang, 2011).  
Using L3 as leverage proxy, the AIC suggests that RE 
is appropriate choice for this dataset as it has lowest AIC 
value compared to other estimators. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the purpose of this study we investigate determinants 
of leverage of chemical sector of Pakistan. In the process 
we also explore which of the two competing theories, that 
is, POT or TOT better explains the leverage behavior of 
chemical sector of Pakistan. Another objective of this 
study is to examine whether the leverage behavior of 
chemical sector firms of Pakistan is likely to be in line 
with the results of international studies of leverage, as 
most of the chemical firms have foreign ownership and/or 
collaboration and whether our results support or negate 
the results of latest studies carried out in Pakistan 
(Qureshi, 2009; Sheikh and Wang, 2011).  
We use three proxies of leverage. Taking long-term 
debt/equity (L1) as a proxy of leverage, we find two direct 
and significant relationships. First, significant direct 
relationship is between profitability and leverage. This 
finding is consistent with TOT and negates the findings of 
earlier studies (Qureshi, 2009; Sheikh and Wang, 2011). 
This finding substantiates our reasoning to choose 
chemical sector as our sample which is  characteristically  
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Table 4. Pooled OLS, FE, RE results for L3. 
 
Variable Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects*  Random Effects Coff SE t  Coff SE t  Coff SE t 
Intercept -15.67 4.959 -3.16***  -17.15 8.219 -2.087**  -15.675 4.959 -3.16*** 
AS 1.75 2.921 0.601  3.386 5.264 0.643  1.757 2.921 0.603 
BZ 0.236 0.411 0.573  0.335 1.172 0.285  0.236 0.411 0.574 
GR 0.0016 0.0195 0.085  0.0001 0.0208 0.0072  0.0016 0.0195 0.085 
PR 2.723 0.336 8.094***  2.642 0.350 7.542***  2.723 0.336 8.094*** 
BR 145.36 38.65 3.761***  143.208 42.193 3.394***  145.36 38.652 3.76*** 
NDTS -7.42 21.02 -0.353  -10.767 25.124 -0.428  -7.42 21.0285 -0.353 
LQ -0.57 0.79 -0.719  -0.6099 0.986 -0.618  -0.570 0.7919 -0.719 
TS 1.146 2.029 0.56  0.679 2.153 0.315  1.146 2.029 0.564 
AC 2.489 2.679 0.929  0.941 3.229 0.291  2.489 2.6795 0.929 
DI -0.904 1.445 -0.629  0.282 1.625 0.174  -0.904 1.445 -0.625 
AG -0.009 0.056 -0.159  0.078 0.136 0.574  -0.009 0.0565 -0.159 
 R2 = 0.218 2 0.189adjR =   R
2 
= 0.255 2 0.169adjR =   R
2 
= 0.221 2 0.192adjR =  
 AIC = 2285.17  AIC= 2312.15  AIC = −2285.171 
 
*P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. *dummies are excluded by software due to existence of multicolinearity problem. 
 
 
 
distinct from other listed sectors, whereas earlier studies 
have used the data of all non-financial sectors listed on 
KSE. Foreign ownership and/or collaboration of chemical 
sector firms do have an impact on the leverage behavior 
of these firms which is in line with their international coun-
terparts and conflicts with their domestic counterparts. 
The use of different proxies to measure the leverage may 
be another reason. Secondly, we find a significant direct 
relationship between business risk and leverage, which is 
also in conflict with an earlier study (Sheikh and Wang, 
2011). The firms having high business risk tend pass it on 
to creditors that may be facilitated through the socio-
political networks of owners/managers of such firms 
and/or the poor governance structure of financial sector 
may provide an easy access to credit market.  
Taking long-term debt/(long-term debt + equity) (L2) as 
proxy of leverage we observe two significant and inverse 
relationships with leverage. The inverse relationship of 
size and leverage is consistent with POT and supports 
the results of previous studies carried out in Pakistan 
(Qureshi, 2009; Sheikh and Wang, 2011). Increase in the 
firms’ size increases the supply and reliance on internal 
sources. Although these firms have foreign ownership 
and/or collaboration, they also use local strategies in 
Pakistan. Further, the significant inverse relationship 
between growth and leverage supports TOT and negates 
these studies whereas one suggests growth to be 
insignificant (Sheikh and Wang, 2011), and other 
observes a direct relationship (Qureshi, 2009). It seems 
that these firms may have limited growth opportunities for 
which they may have sufficient internal sources and may 
not require debt. But, the firms having high business risk 
tend to pass it on to the creditors and do raise debt. 
Taking   total  debt/total  assets  (L3)  as   a   dependent  
variable we find a significant inverse relationship of 
liquidity with leverage. Consequently, we conclude that 
these firms tend to reduce their debt dependence by use 
of internal cash generation. This finding supports the 
POT as well as earlier studies in Pakistani context 
(Qureshi, 2009; Sheikh and Wang, 2011). This finding 
also supports some of the earlier international studies 
(Eriotis et al., 2007; Mazur, 2007). 
Considering the results of three models and using three 
estimators, we conclude that the chemical sector firms of 
Pakistan having higher profits and higher business risk 
prefer higher debt in their capital structure. On the other 
hand the firms prefer lesser debt in their capital structure 
as the firm size increases; they become more liquid and 
have higher growth opportunities. Overall, the chemical 
sector firms of Pakistan having foreign ownership/ 
collaboration use a mix of local and international 
strategies for their leverage formation in Pakistan. A 
similar study for the firms having foreign ownership/ 
collaboration in some other sectors of Pakistani capital 
market or any other emerging capital market may not 
only help better understand the leverage behavior of such 
firms but may also delineate the relevance of such 
studies carried out in developed world. 
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